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The object of this report is to analyse the legal institution of adoption considering 
its use as a possible alternative to assisted reproduction techniques. For this we 
must undoubtedly part from two details that are more or less controversial. One is 
that both procedures serve the same purpose. In this case it could be described as 
the attainment of a child by a couple or by a single adult. As is notorious, both 
cases are not identical for everybody nor are they worthy of the same treatment 
on the part of the Magisterium. In effect, Catholic matrimonial morals and the 
proposal of natural law that has been  secularly sustained by the Church, limits the 
alternative to adoption by a married couple or assisted reproduction also with 
respects to a married couple.1  In this sense, there does not exist a strict relationship 
between the attitude towards the formula of adoption and that had with respects 
to FIVET. For example, adoption of a child by a single person may be 
considered from the perspective of the interests of the child or pondering the 
need at a given moment of having adopters and the situation of urgency that we 
are facing. We are dealing with prudential criterion that impinges on a reality 
that we cannot disregard. Adoption is not true reproduction, which Fivet is. 
Consequently, to the latter is applicable all Christian anthropological construction 
on reproduction, in the strictest sense. As we will see, this will affect the case of 
the adoption of already fertilized embryos.2 They are not adoptions but rather 
FIVET, and they do not imply making the child theirs legally, but also naturally. 
Other cases imply diverse factors that are modifying for different reasons moral 
opinion on this issue.3 To put an example, the Church may accept the licit 
nature of an adoption by a single person, although without a doubt our preference 
is for adoption by a married couple when this is possible, but hardly can the same 
be done with regards to adoption by a de facto 
1 " Poiche solo il matrimonio assicura un esercizio deila sessualita umana semplicemente umana, 
un esercizio doe che ne realizza la bonta essenziale, e grave dovere della legge civile difenderlo e pro-
muoverlo contro ogni tentativo di oscurarne 1'iritima bonta e dignita. Cid deve essere fatto, alrneno, 
matrimonio legittimo", CAFFARRA C, Etica generate della sessnalita, Milano: Ares, 1991: 86-87. 
2 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Donum Vitae, (22.2.1987), II, a, 2 AAS 1988. 
3 JOHN PAUL II, Veritatis Splendor, 1993, n. 48. 
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,. couple. The other relevant data is that one method, adoption, does not pose 
the moral problems existing with FIVET and other forms of assisted repro-
duction. Indeed, those who turn to FIVET from a subjective perspective, or 
the same technique considered alone, may imply a series of diverse purposes 
other than merely making theirs a child that is present in the adoption. 
Amongst these purposes it is possible to highlight, the search for a genetic 
connection between the parents and the children, the recovery of a deceased 
loved one through post mortem fertilization, overcoming natural obstacles to 
unacceptable forms of reproduction, like that of two people of the same gen-
der, or research itself for the subsequent development of therapeutic tech-
niques. For these purposes, very present in FIVET from the beginning, 
although concealed under the discourse of a "remedy for infertility", adop-
tion would not be an alternative, not due to moral reasons but rather in that 
it does not offer the solution to a combination of practices that would not 
only lead to ethical problems with regards to the means or object but also 
with regards to the purpose. It does seem that adoption would be an alterna-
tive to the desire of a married couple of having a child to love and educate. 
The question is, thus, to place adoption as an alternative that is morally 
acceptable in light of Catholic Magisterium. However, we can and we must go 
further. Indeed, FIVET has had a very negative effect on the totality of legal 
ordinances, forcing modifications almost of a constitutional nature, evidently 
by way of a restrictive interpretation of human personality.4 None of this has 
occurred with adoption, which, although it sets forth certain problems, sub-
stantially the formidable increase in the power of the administrative authori-
ties over the family environment, it has followed an evolution affirming the 
rights of man, substantially those of the minor, liberating itself to a certain 
extent from its hereditary past. From this perspective adoption is a legal alter-
native which, "imitating nature", uses adoption in a dual manner. Firstly, it 
offers a home, a family, to a child that needs it, on the other, it satisfies the 
affective needs of a family and allows it to express its altruism by becoming 
the home for this needy person. 
FIVET and adoption, despite their differences, have coincided and been 
the centre of a controversy that has arisen simultaneously in various countries 
during the last few years. Diverse representatives with radical ideology have 
used these two realities as a modifying lever of the judicial order. In Spain, 
where the debate has been very intense, some public representatives have 
4 RONHEIMER M., Derecbo a la vida y estado moderno, Madrid: Rialp, 1998. 
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been skilful when it comes time to "putting ones finger on the wound". 
Recently, as a result of the controversy raised due to the possible adoption of 
minors by homosexual couples, the socialist president of the Autonomous 
Community of Extremadura indicated that in his Autonomous Community it 
was understood that it was necessary to find families for children with that 
need, and not children to people who desired them. This statement, which 
certainly clearly reflects the concept of the " interests of the minor " in Span-
ish adoption law, is an interesting starting point to approach the question of 
adoption as a possible alternative to assisted fertilization.5 
The controversy outlined introduces us to another question, marginal in 
appearance, but which, as we are trying to show, has a strong connection. 
During the last few years both the FIVET as well as adoption have been 
used as elements of standardisation. Indeed, more than covering a need that we 
could denominate as objective, of a response to social problems relating to the 
fall in the birth rate or the urgency of finding a solution to the problem of 
defenceless minors, both the FIVET as well as adoption find themselves amongst 
the elements that determine the alleged discrimination of homosexuals.6 
Consequently, the claim by same appears as an effort in favour of equality and 
the suppression of barriers that has had firm political support, as well as 
support from institutions like the United Nations. This opens a new front where 
. , the Magisterium once again finds itself compelled to take on the defence of 
natural law against the process of sentimental arbitrariness that has been 
imposed as one of the most defining characteristics of our post-modern 
society.7 
In this manner the aim is to obtain, in the name of equality, the legaliza-
tion of inequality, subverting the basic institutions of law. Thus, matrimony, 
institutionally a reality that unites a man and a woman for the sake of form-
ing a family, and that solely for this reason constitutes a reality that is legally 
protected, is transformed into an a la carte institution that has as its sole 
objective the standardization of a certain sexual relationships, for an arbitrary 
term depending on the free will of the spouses. That this is not matrimony is 
notorious, irrespective of the fact that national and international institutions 
disregard such an elemental reality. The place where the person is received 
5 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Considerationes acerca de los proyectos de 
reconotimiento legal de las union es entre personas homosexuales, III, 7. 
6 SERRANO RUIZ-CALDERON J.M., Nuevas cuestiones de bioetica, Pamplona: Eunsa, 2002, chap 
ter IV. 
7 Ibid., chapter III: " Argumentaciones racionales contra el reconotimiento legal de las uniones 
homosexuales". 
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with dignity is in matrimony, foundation of the family. Evidently, it is necessary 
to describe married couples where the person is not welcomed as it deserves, 
where the encounter is not affectionate and where the newborn is not received as 
a gratuitous, but it is not possible to imagine this combination of conditions outside 
the family. It is especially significant to observe how this gratuitous welcome does 
not exhaust its importance in the individual, who sees his condition recognized 
by the parents and the community, but rather transfers his stamp on the place of 
the welcome, that is the family, which at that moment acquires its true meaning. 
The paternity/maternity experience, constantly reiterated, open to receiving the 
gift of life, constitutes a community that overcomes the technological aspect so as 
to appreciate the donation, love and solidarity.8 
This perspective of donation requires a donor. This breaks the logic that is merely 
productive and constitutes man as someone who is not the property of anybody. 
This perspective allows us to discover the concept of gratuity, which without God 
lacks all meaning, and allows man, which is this manner receives and is received, 
to pass on this experience to the rest of the community that surrounds him, and 
to the world where man, by participating, acquires the status of guardian of 
love.9 
If we exclude the circumstances that refer to the FIVET, which is not a direct 
object of our analysis, we can state that in the recent past adoption and FIVET 
have followed divergent paths. 
Indeed, in principle, adoption was conceived as a method that fundamentally 
referred to the interests of the adopter, or rather as a legal means by which to 
cover other objectives pertaining to inheritance or the maintenance of the family 
name. Moreover, adoption was contemplated with a strong distrust during the 
whole elaboration process of continental law. Examples of this relative rejection 
would be the prohibition of adopting if legitimate children existed, in order not to 
be detrimental to the heirs, and the norms on the difference in age and the 
minimum age for adoption that delayed same until a clearly mature age, for 
example, in Italian law until fifty years of age. The minimum differences of age 
required for the adopter and the adopted is also good evidence of the manner in 
which the lawmakers contemplated the institution. On this point, we can observe 
notable mistrust of the reasons for an adoption by a person from the opposite sex, 
for example. 
8  JOHN PAUL II, Evangelium Vitae, 1995, n. 2; n. 7. * 
 9  Ibid., n. 92. 
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The aim was to avoid an intrusion within the natural family, clearly privi-
leged and in relation with which adoption was contemplated as a kind of 
interference. Naturally, we must understand that under the denomination of 
adoption, Roman adoptio, very disparate realities have been observed. 
In the institutions covered in the Hamurabi code, like the "marutu", 
which has as its object the assumption of the legal paternity on the part of one 
person over another, to place the latter in the situation of being able to 
inherit, we can observe the use of the institution for diverse purposes, includ-
ing educational. 
The legal origin of the majority of our legislation is found in the Roman 
adoptio, which in the definition put forth by Eduardo Volterra is presented as 
the passing of a free aliena iuri subiecta person to the authority of another free 
person.10 The method was a triple sale of theson that produced the suppres-
sion of the first bond. Subsequently followed the claim of paternal authority 
by the adopter, to which the former did not oppose. Amongst the purposes 
of said action was notably the desire not to lose the family name and the 
maintenance of the cults linked to the domus, to the lares and penates. It was 
reasonable that with the Christianity the institution fell into certain disuse. 
Naturally we cannot forget the political practice of adoption as a form of 
succession that was used during the empire. In justinianeo law adoption will 
appear as a legal business transaction between the parents, to which the 
adopted child gives its conformity, having previously suppressed the emanci-
pation. It is necessary to remember that this process is linked to the modifi-
cation of the rigidity of the primitive Roman parental authority, which even 
during its time surprised because of its harshness.11 
In intermediate law, adoptio in hereditatem prevails. In the absence of 
carnal children, clearly privileged after the preponderance in Christianity of 
the natural family, it was possible to create fictitious offspring. The lex rubi-
raria allowed the transmission of assets in the absence of a will by means of 
three systems. One, the adoption of a hereditary title, two, the transmission 
inter vivos through a series of written procedures, and three, the transmis-
sion of the assets by tradionem et testibus. Carlomagno imposed public con-
trol, requiring the presence of the King, or a count, or before the missi 
domini. 
10 VOLTERJRA E., Adozione, diritti orientate, greco, romano, Novissimo Digesto Italiano, Torino: 
UTET, 1957: 286-288. 
1 SCHLUZ R, Derecho Romano Cldsico, Barcelona: Bosch, 1960: 135. 
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Christian law tended to protect the natural family by means of the insti-
tution of legitimacy. This practice, in contrast to the free disposition of the 
assets, favours the legal adoption by heirs as contrasted with other ordinances. 
Indeed, common law ignored adoption in its legal tradition. According to 
Caroline Bridge, the first territory of the Commonwealth that recognized a 
form of adoption was New Zealand in 1881.12 In any case, throughout the 
industrial revolution illegal adoptions were taking place where wealthier fam-
ilies were taking care of children living under conditions of abandonment. 
Some of these formulas were extended by medieval institutions, like taking in 
children as pages or servants. During the hard times of the industrial revolu-
tion, these formulas created situations of abuse, reinforced by tendencies to 
lighten state loads in orphanages by sending the children to rural families, 
where it was very common for them not to receive moderately acceptable 
treatment. 
In this sense, we can consider that under this law the tendency towards 
legal adoption may be considered as an effort in the search for the protection 
of minors, in contrast to other clearly debatable formulas. This line culminates 
in the Adoption Act of 1926. 
Under civil law adoption was conceived as a form of imitating ones own 
filiation. The fundamental objective would be to obtain heirs to the family 
assets or name by those who would not have been able to obtain same. This 
factor is fundamental for understanding a series of dispositions common to 
comparative law aimed at guaranteeing the situation of possible legitimate 
heirs, present or future. In such a manner is understood the condition of 
age that required the adopter to be fifty years old, and forty under certain 
conditions, fundamentally that they could not have children. In this sense, it 
is possible to find a clear distinction between the equivalent adoption and 
the more contemporary model. The intention of the former was to protect 
the rights of the legitimate children, the latter to guarantee equality in the 
treatment of the children, protecting the adopted child from suffering dis-
crimination. 
The legal requirement that the adopter not have legitimate or legitimated 
descendants is understood in this manner. To that was added the requirement 
of having a good reputation and, finally, the convenience of the action from 
the adopted child's perspective, in. principle based fundamentally on patrimo-
nial criterion so as to avoid abuse with regards to the minor's assets. 
12 BRIDGE C, SWINDELLS H., Adoption-The modern law, Family Law 2003. 
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The fundamental change in direction arose around the phenomenon of 
the world wars, with its tremendous consequences, seen in the number of 
orphans. The Spanish Civil War, slightly before, also marked this trend within 
Spanish law itself. The phenomenon of abandonment and the interest in 
attempting to find a family for minors in this situation has decisively modified 
this institution. The reigning concept in an adoption, and the intermediate 
formula that has arisen, all evolve around the interests of the minor. In con-
trast to the previous law, this concept pushes in the direction of the elimina-
tion of all distinctions between natural and adoptive filiation, which to a cer-
tain extent contributes to the subsequent abandonment of the distinction in 
the filiation between the so-called legitimate children, today matrimonial, and 
the illegitimate or natural children. 
To this process has contributed the growing power of the state and their 
concern for the situation of minors within conflicting family environments. 
Legislation has limited the classic paternal authority, which passes to be inter-
preted in view of the situation of the children rather than as the rights of the 
parent. The effect has been a growing intervention of the judicial authority 
and, what is more debatable, that of social workers, resulting in a good num-
ber of minors being declared defenceless. To this it is necessary to add 
another phenomenon that could be considered paradoxical, which is, the 
observation of the psychological inadequacy of the state or social institutions, 
for example the orphanages, to cover the needs for the correct upbringing of 
the children. The paradox lies in that the growing state intervention takes 
place within a context in which it is recognized that children need a family 
atmosphere for their correct upbringing. Thus, adoption appears as a funda-
mental solution to a problem that contemporary society suffers with force. 
It would be ingenuous to believe that this data completely defines adop-
tion. Indeed, the developed countries present characteristics that explain the 
new pre-eminence of adoption and also, by the way, of the desperate 
resource of FIVET, in a good number of cases. We could cite the following. 
The delay in the age of matrimony in countries like Spain, to the age of 
thirty, means that women enter marriage with their fertile age very 
advanced, to this it is necessary to add the continuous use of birth-control 
methods with effects on the fertility of women and the decrease suffered by 
masculine fertility as a result of problems linked to lifestyle, and others of 
an unknown origin. The effect is a growing number of couples with fertility 
problems, of which some turn to assisted fertilization methods but many 
others turn to adoption. Due to the shortage in the number of non conflic- 
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tive children In their early years ages that can be adopted in the developed 
countries, a new phenomenon has arisen, international adoption.13 It is ne-
cessary to highlight that this phenomenon is grievous and difficult for the 
adopters, and shows their enormous will in trying to constitute a family with 
descendants. Evidently, the fact that many of the adopters already have their 
own children likewise proves an altruistic attitude and solidarity, fact that 
evidently cannot be obviated.14 
According to Aristotelian tradition, this desire, correctly channelled, is 
clearly virtuous. Indeed, the satisfaction in the virtue, raising a child, rein-
forces the kindness of the act. However, it is important not to forget that this 
desire is not always legitimate in the methods used. Indeed, in adoption 
abuses of this type can be observed. For example, in some forms of interna-
tional adoption. In the FIVET the statement of the alleged right to a child has 
directly led to abuses against human dignity. 
The desire to have a child combines in this case with the interests of the 
minor, whom, usually in developing countries, find themselves in a situation 
of abandonment. It is necessary to highlight that the law, both nationally as 
well as internationally, has had to make an effort to provide guarantees so as 
to avoid inevitable abuses that could arise in these adoptions. International 
adoption law has benefited from the protective current of minor's rights that 
appears included under the concept "the superior interest of the child", in 
Spanish legislation pertaining to the interests of the minors. 
Thus, the Declaration of Children's Rights of 1959 declares that: "The 
child will enjoy special protection and will have opportunities and services, all 
this set forth by the law and through other means, so that the child can 
develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and 
normal manner, as well as in conditions of freedom and dignity. Upon pro-
mulgating laws with this purpose, the fundamental consideration to be 
adhered to will be the superior interest of the child ". 
Along these lines, the Convention of the Hague relative to the protection 
of minors and international cooperation relative to the protection of minors 
and cooperation in the field of international adoption intends " to establish 
guarantees so that international adoptions take place in consideration of the 
superior interest of the child and respect of the fundamental rights that are 
recognized to children pursuant to international law". 
15 LAZARO  L, Los menores en el derecho espafwl, Madrid: Tecnos, 2002: 4l6ff 
 14 BRIDGE, SWINDELLS, Adoption the modem law..., pp. 289-354. 
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Within the regional European environment we can observe the same ten-
dency, which will have, evidently, effects in the field of adoption. Together 
with the Agreements within the core of the European Council, we can detain 
ourselves on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
which, in article 24, states that: Children shall have the right to such protec-
tion and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views 
freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters that concern 
them in accordance with their age and maturity 
In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or 
private institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration. 
Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship and direct contact with both his/her parents, unless that is con-
trary to his/her interests ". 
The most contemporary adoption is governed by the concept of the inter-
ests of the minor.15 This substitutes other considerations like lightening the 
state loads in relation with orphanages, which to a certain extent initiates the 
process, or the interests of the legitimate children to the inheritance. I almost 
dare to affirm that the loss of relevance of the inheritance itself in the strongly 
socialized systems that we find throughout a good part of the world also con-
tributes to the tendency outlined. 
It has been said that the concept of the interests of the minor is a concept 
that is legally vague. This is true but it is also true that it remits to a combina-
tion of social valuations that are outlined in legislation and jurisprudence. The 
conditions that in general are required in practice are truly revealing of another 
contemporary phenomenon. As the crisis relative to the legal treatment of the 
family, more than the family in itself, worsens, the ideal description reinforces 
the role of the family in the strictest sense, which is the one that, apart from 
ideology, is required in adoptions, in that it is understood that it favours the 
interests of the minor. As a vague juridical concept, the superior interest of the 
minor, it is necessary to distinguish three ambits, one of positive certainty, or 
non debatable elements, another of negative certainty, or clearly excluded sit-
uations, and an "intermediate area", of variation or uncertainty, where there is 
room for several options within the margins of valuation. 
In English law, the commission that prepared the Children Act of 1989 
included some of the criterion that could be used in this determination. These 
15 RIVERO HERNANDEZ E, El interés del menor, Madrid: Dykinson 2000; LAZARO GALDIANO, LOS 
menores en el derecbo..., pp. 98-121. 
2 5 8  JM. Serrano Ruiz-Calderón 
would be: " The wishes and feelings of the child, considered in view of their age 
and discernment, their physical, educational and emotional needs, the probable 
effects of any change in their situation, their age, sexual atmosphere and any other 
characteristic of the child that the court may consider relevant, any harm suffered or 
risk of suffering it, capacity of each of the parents, or the person being considered 
to satisfy the needs of the minor and, finally, the range of powers at the disposal of 
the tribunal ",16 
This pre-eminence of the interests of the minor explains likewise the line of 
argument with regards to adoption by homosexual couples. From the perspective of 
homosexual activism, and the radicals that support it, the question is put forth as a 
problem that evolves around the so-called right to a child. The idea, evidently, is 
not to carry out acts that may produce a child, but that they be handed over a child 
that to a certain extent reinforces the " normality" of their love. 
The opposing argument has not been centred on the naturalness of the family 
in the strictest sense, or on the irreplaceable elements of the institution of marriage, 
but rather on the affective and psychological needs of the minors and the 
inconveniences for them of being raised in an environment with such special roles, 
as occurs with a homosexual couple. It is very significant that in the debate in Spain 
there were continuous appeals to call on the psychologists, ; . . .  whom would 
constitute here a kind of a new technocracy, or what Maclntyre has denominated 
the dominance of therapists.17 This evidently proves that even the scientific reference 
in the determination of the interests of the minor, for example parting from 
psychology, must part from an axiological option. 
For some radicals this would lead to total arbitrariness in the determination of the 
interests of the minor, which in reality it cedes, although not nominally, faced with 
the interests of the strong spirit, to use the sadistic expression, present in adoption 
for example on the part of a couple of the same gender. This position is reinforced in 
the scientific crisis when doubts are cast on the objectivity of the therapist, similar 
to what we have observed has happened in cultured morality and in its concept of 
naturalness. 
On the other hand, for those who interpret that reality, that is, the truth, outlines an 
axiological structure, marked, for example, by the concept of telos, this 
determination of the interests of the minor is possible in a different form to the one 
that we could denominate dominant although in crisis. 
16Ibid., p. 65. 
17  MACINTYRE  A., After virtue, Barcelona: Crítica, 1987: 48-49. 
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It is possible to determine the interests of the minor in view of the telos 
of the human individual, and in connection with the socially relevant values. 
It is possible in connection with the natural rights of the families, with the 
definition itself of same, with the validity of the subsidiariness in the opera 
tion of the social and political institutions, with the interpretation of what 
education is, and so forth for a long etc. Naturally, this vision can darken at 
certain moments, as occurs at present in the majority of our societies, but it is  
not very difficult to prove that this is due " to the false prudence of wise  
and to the abuse by the powerful". 
Artificial fertilization has, seemingly, a much less complex history. Stem 
ming from veterinary science, its objective in humans seems to be directly 
related to overcoming problems of infertility. The purpose is to obtain a child, 
preferably a descendant of the person turning to fertilization. Louise Brown 
was born in England, fruit of the efforts of the doctors Patrick Steptoe, gine 
cologist from Oldham General Hospital and Robert Edwards, physiologist  
from Cambridge University. Her parents had attempted for many years to have  
a child, but an obstruction in Fallopian tube of the mother prevented this. 
The technique applied for such a surprising process, that reminded many 
of the foresight of the work of Aldous Huxley " Brave new world ", was being 
developed since 1966, but had always failed a few weeks after the embryo was 
transferred to the mother. 
From 1978 onwards the technique improved its limited success, and was 
extended to many countries, constituting a hope of having children for 
women with impediments of diverse types. Although from a demographic 
point of view the phenomenon of in vitro fertilisation with the transfer of 
embryos (FIVET) has had a scarce impact - some hundreds of thousands of 
births during the first twenty years -, with regards to legislation, especially in 
family law, and the human embryo statute, the effect has been very notable. 
In this manner, the presence of sperm or ovule donors has meant that assisted 
fertilization has had an impact on questions such as the recognition of the 
children in couples, investigation into paternity, prohibited in this context in 
Spanish legislation, constituting an exception to the general rule, or even to 
the obviousness that the child belongs to the mother that gives birth. 
(Although under Spanish law this rule has been maintained to avoid substi-
tute or surrogate mothers). 
Very soon the technique had its detractors, as well as staunch partisans. 
Among the first we could highlight Jacques Testart himself, technical creator 
of the first French test tube baby. The warnings with regards to the FIVET 
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have been divided into two categories. The first makes reference to the possi-
ble effects of the deviations of the technique with respects to the first pro-
posed objective, to overcome diverse forms of infertility. Thus, denounced 
was the appearance of diverse forms of surrogate mothers, with gestation by 
commission, admitted under some laws but clearly rejected under continental 
legislation. Likewise the procreation of children for diverse reasons other than 
for their own existence, as siblings created to act as donors for some already 
existing brother. Moreover, an announcement was made with respects to 
attempts to overcome menopause with the famous mother grandmothers, 
there was discussion on the possibility of creating children for homosexual 
couples with diverse combinations, the application of a massive eugenics, or 
even the possible creation of human-animal hybrids. It was considered that 
the biggest step would come with human cloning, in principle rejected with 
big declarations, but then admitted by some under the so-called "therapeu-
tic " cloning, more exactly known as research cloning. 
Other doubts on the FIVET were centred on more nuclear aspects of the 
phenomenon. They explain, to a good extent, the desertion of Testart from 
the practice and the criticism that the technique suffered very soon by very 
relevant authors like Jerome Lejeune.18 The impression that in vitro fertilisation 
implied an advancement with respects to other techniques of assisted fer-
tilization, and the transfer of human procreation to the laboratory, detaching 
it to a certain extent from its personal aspect: procreation of a person by 
other parties within a framework of profound commitment and meaning, in 
such a manner that it became a technical act that seemed to many to be 
unworthy. 
The position of Pontifical Magisterium was very clear on this aspect, but 
it is convenient to recall that it was not only one: although to a certain extent 
it was pioneer,19 soon it was accompanied by prestigious bioethics like Leon 
Kass himself, of Jewish confession.20  
Certain bioethical thought has wanted to present these doubts as charac-
teristic of an almost superstitious naturalism. To a certain extent it is said that 
technical intervention is in itself human, and that the final objective sought 
was good: to overcome the inconveniences of sterility. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the child fruit of in vitro fertilization is the most sought after 
18 LEJEUNE J., L}enceinte concentmtionaire, Paris: Fayard, 1990. 
19 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Donum Vitae, II, B, 4, b} AAS 1988. 
20 KASS L.R., Life, liberty and the defense of dignity. The challenge for bioethics, San Francisco: 
Encounter Books, 2002: 85. 
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child, with very profound personal and economic costs for the parents, and 
even detached from sexual impulse. There are no accidents in in vitro fertilization, it is 
argued: all the children fruit of same are wanted, with the importance that this concept 
of " desired child " has, after the generalization of deliberate abortions. 
Sufficient time has elapsed so as to carry out a balanced examination of this 
criticism based on experience. 
One of the most profound bioethical concerns is the risk that technology entails for 
human beings themselves, given that the human being has gone from being the 
subject of all scientific action to being the object of same: from manipulator of nature 
to object of its own manipulation, in a manner that was unthinkable before the 
scientific revolution. 
The relevance of the technical nature of human procreation resides, firstly, in the 
substitution of the concept of procreation itself by that of production, even if it is 
with a beneficent objective, however, it has a second link in its impact on the 
phenomenon of freedom. It is the main supporter of novelty. Thus, the tendency to 
control it is a vain effort of dominating the future or, if one wants, of manipulating 
the human of the future. Allied with positive genetic manipulation, that is, with the 
predetermination of personal qualities, chosen externally, it is a threat to real change, 
for the sake of an absurd effort to control. 
It is true, however, that from the beginning artificial fertilization has shown a 
tendency to stray from this line that we are describing, through the inclusion in 
practice of donors outside the realms of a couple, or being directly situated 
outside a matrimonial environment, with the fertilization of single women, or 
finally, becoming the means used to totally avoid the naturalness of procreation 
through substitute maternity, in the politically more correct expression, more 
exactly denominated surrogate mothers or hiring of uteruses. Legislation like the 
Spanish has prohibited this last modality, but there is certain pressure for its 
legalization. The reason for the latter is the same reason underlying, for example, 
arguments to extend the premises for the selection of gender, the clinics intention of 
enlarging the market. This economic aspect of the FIVET has been constantly 
obviated, a very clear example of the ideologization of the problem. Thus, the 
whole discussion on the FIVET enters into rhetoric of good intentions that is at the 
least suspicious. The FIVET is not a very effective technique, clearly in regression in 
veterinary science, for example, that has followed in its legislative translation an 
exact opposed direction to that of adoption. If adoption evolves from a pat- 
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rimonial conception to the hegemony of the interests of the minor, in the le-
gislation on assisted reproduction nothing similar exists. Moreover, in a similar 
manner to how the new legislation on adoption has required a modification 
of the most classical conception of paternal authority, with a tendency to 
change authority with responsibility, the FIVET has required a change in the 
consideration of the human being in the prenatal phase, going from the 
almost total non-protection of what under Spanish legislation is denominated 
pre-embryo to the point of the selection of the re-implant or abortion to pro-
tect the level of the quality of the result of the action. 
In the FIVET, together with the greater issue for us of the unworthy sep-
aration of a loving union and reproduction, we observe other tendencies. The 
first is the severing of the FIVET from its alleged therapeutic objective. 
Indeed, with great clarity from the beginning in Anglo-Saxon law, and with 
growing incidence in continental law, although the rhetorical claim is to over-
come forms of infertility, this symptom is. not a requirement, for turning to 
these techniques. Moreover, there exists a reasonable doubt, which goes 
beyond that expressed by Testart in his book "the transparent embryo", that 
the intention of providing children to couples that need them, is the underly-
ing main tendency of the FIVET, given that under this excuse the FIVET has 
allowed research on human embryos to reach levels that would have been 
unreachable without this ideological alibi. The action taken both in budgetary 
terms as well as in the modification of legislation or in international Declara-
tions seems excessive when faced with the 1600 children a year that are born 
in Spain, for example, with these techniques. 
On the other hand, if the FIVET is physically grievous for whoever con-
sents to use same, it is not greater than international adoption in budgetary 
terms. It is convenient to remember that faced with the shortage of adoptable 
children in developed countries, this formula is the most used. But, moreover, 
the complex analysis to which whomever wishes to adopt is subjected to, with 
regards to the suitability of their customs, their reasons for adoption, their 
past life, the couple's stability, equality regarding other children etc., does not 
take place with those who consent to the FIVET. In the strictest sense, we 
would be talking of a therapy with no control of the symptoms, in which pre-
vails the interest manifested by whomever wants to turn to the FIVET, with-
out any other consideration. Certainly, the interest of the nasciturus hardly 
appears. This explains the difficulties of limiting the FIVET when, for exam-
ple, I have knowledge of the so-called mother-grandmothers, that is, whom 
have surpassed the age of menopause, or of the conflicts with post-morterm 
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fertilization, which still prohibited under various legislation, reappear period-
ically at least as a vindication. It is contradictory to the interests of the minor 
to be born an orphan exprofeso, or of an unknown father exprofeso, or of a 
biologically unknown mother exprofeso, or of an old mother in identical form, 
but this argument doesn't especially impact the FIVET since its own logic is 
diverse. 
This is why it is possible to conclude that the FIVET cannot be repaired 
or has no manner of renewing itself into an ethically and legally acceptable 
practice. It is not about perfectioning the technique so as to limit its high rate 
of abortion, or of regulating it to avoid its most prominent edges, the FIVET 
is in itself reprehensible. 
This is the opposite to adoption, based on the interests of the minor, and 
although as all human institutions it is susceptible of suffering reprehensible 
deviations, adoption is an act of altruism that should be fomented in that "it 
solves the need of a born minor and it allows a married couple to receive the 
gift of being able to offer their love, be it because of the impossibility of hav-
ing children by another morally acceptable method, or because of a well 
intended act of solidarity with children deprived of a family. 
We could say that faced with this biological fact and the law, both insti-
tutions follow a diametrically opposed path. That is why it is very unjust for 
those of us opposed to the FIVET to be labelled biologists. Indeed, adoption 
overcomes a biological difficulty, for example, sterility, using the law to make a 
child legal, where the affection establishes the paternal-maternal relationship, 
without any biological relationship. The children are not biologically their 
children, but the law and the refuge given makes them theirs in the strictest 
sense, in such a manner that it makes up any difference with the biological 
child. In the FIVET the difficulty is overcome by means of a technical 
intervention that substitutes the encounter of two people's love, such that the 
biological aspect, substituted the matrimonial encounter, is the most relevant. 
This claim is very clear when attempting to overcome essential biological dif-
ficulties, as it is to obtain a child from a dead person, or to obtain a biological 
child from people of the same gender by means of some form of cloning. 
